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Abstract—This paper describes an effective method for signal-
authentication and spoofing detection for civilian GNSS receivers 
using the GPS L1 C/A and the Galileo E1-B Safety of Life 
service. The paper discusses various spoofing attack profiles and 
how the proposed method is able to detect these attacks. This 
method is relatively low-cost and can be suitable for numerous 
mass-market applications. This paper is the subject of a pending 
patent. 
 
Index Terms—Spoofing Detection, Global Positioning System, 
Galileo, Signal Authentication, Security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) 
have seen near exponential growth in the number of low-
cost precise timing and positioning applications in the market. 
The acceptance of this technology by many industries has led 
to its widespread adoption, often without consideration of the 
potential security risks the use of GNSS can have on safety 
and financially critical applications. 
Trusted positioning and timing services are not only a pre-
requisite for safety and financially critical applications, but 
also a requirement for location-based security services such as 
geo-encryption and position attestation. To date, location-
based security services using GNSS have had limited success 
for mass-market applications, due to the lack of suitable low-
cost spoofing-detection and anti-spoofing technologies.  
Spoofing and jamming pose serious threats to such 
applications. While a jamming attack typically aims to disrupt 
or degrade the performance of a GNSS receiver, by 
transmitting radio signals that interfere with genuine GNSS 
signals received from space, a successful spoofing attack can 
be significantly more hazardous. Spoofing aims to deceive a 
GNSS receiver as to its time and position by generating a 
simulated GNSS signal that appears to be genuine to the 
receiver.  
Attack scenarios for applications such as geo-fencing (e.g. 
vessel monitoring for fish stock management) and GNSS-
based digital rights management differ in that an attacker 
would attempt to spoof the position / time of his own receiver 
in order to defeat a GNSS-based access control system (self-
spoofing). As the attacker is in possession of the GNSS 
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receiver, a GNSS simulator could be connected directly to the 
receiver using an RF cable before it is turned on. Spoofing 
under these conditions is more difficult to detect if the 
simulation is accurate, as no genuine GNSS signals are visible 
to the receiver.  
The cost of orchestrating a spoofing attack is no longer a 
determining risk factor, as signal simulators can be rented 
cheaply and sophisticated spoofing attacks can be developed 
on low-cost software-defined radio platforms that are readily 
available. Such platforms provide significant open-source 
software support. In this paper we propose a technique for the 
detection of spoofing on open civilian GNSS signals, which is 
suitable for low-cost GNSS receivers. The proposed technique 
addresses the spoofing scenarios that are discussed in this 
paper.  
II. BACKGROUND 
This section provides a high-level overview of the GNSS 
receiver functions relevant to the spoofing detection method. 
Figure 1 illustrates the fundamental components of a typical 
GNSS receiver: a Low-Noise Amplifier (LNA), an RF Front-
End and a baseband processor. The RF front end is responsible 
for the down-conversion of the signal to an intermediate 
frequency and the digitization of the signal using an analogue 
to digital converter (ADC). The baseband processor acquires 
and tracks satellites using the digitized signal. 
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Figure 1. Basic GNSS receiver 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the logical processing blocks in the 
baseband processor. The acquisition function involves finding 
the carrier frequency and code phase for each visible satellite 
in the digitized signal. This information is passed to the 
tracking function, which is responsible for keeping track of the 
code phase of each acquired satellite in the signal. In order to 
track and demodulate the signal of a satellite, the tracking 
module has to generate two replicas, one for the carrier and 
one for the code. To produce the exact replicas, a carrier 
tracking loop (Costas loop) and a code tracking loop (delay 
lock loop) are required.  
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A delay lock loop (DLL) is a tracking loop that correlates the 
input signal with three replicas of the code (early, prompt and 
late), each nominally generated with a typical spacing of  ± ½ 
a chip. The three outputs are integrated and dumped, providing 
an indication as to how much the specific code replica 
correlates with the code in the incoming signal, and therefore 
whether the signal is in phase, early or late by ½ a chip. If the 
signal is not in phase, the replica is then adjusted so that it is in 
phase. These functions are typically performed in hardware.  
The navigation data extraction function performs bit and 
frame synchronization using the code phase information 
provided by the tracking module, such that the beginning of a 
subframe can be identified and the navigation data can be 
obtained. From the identified beginning of subframes for a set 
of channels, the pseudoranges can be computed. The 
navigation data provides the necessary data for applying clock 
corrections, calculating the positions of the satellites, and 
correcting the pseudoranges for tropospheric and ionospheric 
delays. 
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Figure 2. Logical processing blocks in the baseband processor 
 
The user position is calculated by solving a nonlinear equation 
used to determine the user position and clock bias from the 
satellite positions and corrected pseudorange observations for 
at least four satellites, commonly calculated by linearizing the 
equation using the least-squares method. The pseudorange 
calculation process of the GNSS receiver is of particular 
interest to the spoofing detection method presented in this 
paper. The following subsection briefly describes this 
function. 
A. Pseudorange calculation 
Pseudorange measurements are computed as the travel time 
( )kiτ  of the GNSS signal from satellite k  to receiver i . The 
relationship between kiτ and the pseudorange ( )kiP is defined 
in Equation (1.1) as: 
 
k k k
i i it t P cτ− = =  (1.1) 
 
where, it  is the time at which the GNSS signal was received 
by receiver i , kt is the time of transmission of the GNSS 
signal by satellite k , and c is the velocity of light in a vacuum. 
In obtaining the digitized signal data, there is no absolute time 
reference and the only time reference is the sampling 
frequency. As a result, pseudoranges can be measured only in 
a relative way, as the time difference between the start of a 
subframe with respect to a reference satellite (the satellite with 
the earliest arriving subframe). The start of a subframe is 
identified by correlating the navigation data with the 
preamble. This provides the frame (code epoch / millisecond 
of the signal for GPS) in which the subframe starts. 
Subsequent steps must be taken to validate the navigation 
data, by verifying parity, etc. 
In order to obtain a pseudorange with sufficient precision, the 
start of the spreading code in the specific frame must be 
found. The resolution of the pseudorange measurement is the 
sample frequency. The number of samples contained in a 
frame is a multiple of 1023 for GPS or 4092 for Galileo E1-B, 
where a frame represents the code epoch (1ms for GPS or 4ms 
for Galileo E1-B).  
III. SPOOFING SCENARIOS 
This subsection discusses a number of likely spoofing 
scenarios for both GPS and Galileo, given the target and 
application domain of low-cost GNSS receivers. Spoofing 
attacks such as Meaconing, involving the delay and 
rebroadcast of GNSS signals, are not discussed in this paper. 
Such methods do not involve simulation, but rather the delay 
of genuine GNSS signals in order to create large errors in the 
navigation solution. Such techniques involve very low cost 
equipment and can be assembled from readily available 
components using schematics found on the Internet. One such 
system [1] claims to be able to spoof the position of a GPS 
receiver approximately 100 meters (300 feet) . Meaconing also 
affects encrypted signals such as the GPS P(Y) signal and the 
Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS).  
The spoofing scenarios that will be discussed in this paper 
involve simulation of GNSS signals. The primary objective of 
this type of spoofing attack is to deceive the target receiver by 
simulating GNSS signals in order to provide the target 
receiver with a falsified position and/or time. For the purpose 
of this paper, we group simulation-based spoofing attacks into 
the following three categories:  
• Unsynchronized: We define an unsynchronized 
spoofing as an attack that involves radiating the signal 
from a GNSS simulator towards the target receiver 
using an antenna or RF cable, where the simulator is 
autonomous (i.e. not synchronized with the GNSS 
constellation). The 1PPS (1 Pulse Per Second) output 
of an external GNSS receiver may be used to 
synchronize the time of the simulation to GNSS. This 
type of attack is also characterized as an 
unsophisticated attack as it can be accomplished with 
off-the-shelf equipment and minimal configuration. 
• Loosely Synchronized: We define a loosely 
synchronized spoofing as an attack that aims to mimic 
the actual constellation in terms of time, Doppler 
frequency, pseudorange, navigation data and C/N0 for 
each channel. This type of attack can be developed 
with a trivial amount of software development and off 
the shelf equipment including a simulator supporting 
remote control of signal generation parameters, and a 
GNSS receiver that provides the required raw 
measurements. This type of attack does not achieve 
synchronization of the simulation and the actual 
constellation to within half a chip of the actual GNSS 
signal for each channel (in order to be captured by the 
early, late or prompt correlator). The attack will most 
probably require jamming or significantly higher signal 
power in order to force the receiver to lose code lock 
and initiate re-acquisition. The loss of code lock and bit 
/ frame synchronization are potentially indicators of 
spoofing or tracking in a difficult environment (e.g. 
urban canyon or entry in a tunnel). A spoofer may 
 3 
attempt to hide such evidence by initiating an attack in 
a tunnel or difficult environment, or by creating in-
band interference that significantly degrades navigation 
performance. 
• Tightly Synchronized: We define tightly synchronized 
spoofing as an attack that attempts to synchronize the 
simulated signal to within half a chip of the actual 
signal, such that the receiver does not loose code lock 
and will start tracking the spoofed signal due to the 
higher correlation value of the spoofed signal. This 
type of attack most likely requires purpose built 
hardware, as it relies on functionality not commonly 
found in commercial simulators. It is important that the 
power of the spoofed signal is not significantly higher 
than the actual signal and consistently higher across all 
channels as to raise suspicion. By facilitating the 
capture of each channel in a non-obvious way (i.e. a 
single channel at a time, random channel selection and 
random intervals between each channel capture), 
changes in the observed C/N0 should not raise 
suspicion. 
The following subsections discuss previous work in relation to 
the types of spoofing attacks described above and provide a 
discussion of loosely and tightly synchronized spoofing 
scenarios. The unsynchronized scenario is not discussed in this 
paper, as this type of spoofing can be easily detected by a 
number of simple signal sanity checks as detailed in Section 
III.A. 
A. Previous Work  
The Volpe report [2] noted that in 2001 there were no practical 
mitigation methods available for spoofing attacks, and that a 
few potentially effective techniques would be too expensive 
for civilian applications, in particular intelligent transportation 
systems. Based on the literature reviewed, we believe that this 
is still the case. Approaches to providing an anti-spoofing 
capability for civilian receivers include navigation message 
authentication; the insertion of non-deterministic hidden 
markers or spread spectrum security codes in the signal; 
exploitation of signals that civilians do not have access to (e.g. 
the P(Y) of GPS) and are unable to simulate; and simple 
consistency checks. 
Navigation message authentication (NMA) has been proposed 
by numerous researchers [3] [4] [5] and involves the reception 
of authentication data by a GNSS receiver (either within the 
navigation message or provided by a third-party), allowing it 
to authenticate the source of the navigation message and verify 
its cryptographic integrity (i.e. detection of unauthorized 
modification of the message). Conceptually, an adversary 
would not be able to simulate authentication data, as he/she 
would not have the keys required to generate it. The spoofing 
protection afforded by NMA is minimized by the fact that a 
spoofer can acquire the legitimate signal and replay the 
navigation message (containing the authentication data) over 
the simulated signal. 
Spread spectrum security codes or hidden markers have been 
proposed by Scott in [3] and Kuhn in [5]. Spectrum Security 
Codes (SSSC), interleaved with the normal spreading codes, 
are used to facilitate signal authentication. These codes or 
hidden markers are not perceivable by an adversary, as the 
power of signal received from space is below thermal noise. A 
receiver is able to authenticate the signal on receipt of an 
authentication message (transmitted in the navigation 
message) by a receiver, which is used to generate a replica of 
the SSSC sequence. The message is released several minutes 
after the sequence has already been transmitted. This allows 
the receiver to de-spread previously collected and stored 
samples. The signal is authenticated when the SSSC is 
detected at the correct power level. Both NMA and SSSCs 
require modifications to GPS / Galileo messages and/or signal 
design. SSSCs in particular can result in deteriorated 
navigation performance, and have therefore not been 
considered in evolutions of GPS and Galileo. 
Other methods for anti-spoofing include signal access control 
achieved through encryption of the spreading code. Such 
mechanisms typically involve the modolo-2 sum of the 
spreading sequence with a encrypting code. An example of 
this is the P(Y) signal of GPS. The P(Y)-code is the modulo-2 
sum of the P-code and an unknown encrypting code called the 
W-code. The W-code is a pseudo-random sequence of chips 
that occur at a rate of 511.5 kHz, such that there are 20 P-code 
chips for every W-code chip. The Y-code cannot be de-spread 
by a replica P-code unless it is decrypted. Decryption consists 
of multiplying the Y-code by a receiver-generated replica of 
the W-code made available only to authorized users. Since the 
encrypting W-code is not known by spoofers, illegitimate 
signals can be easily identified as spoofers cannot recreate the 
P(Y) signal. Unfortunately, the P(Y) signal is not available to 
civilian users.  
An anti-spoofing method proposed by [6] uses the P(Y) signal 
to authenticate GPS signals for civilian receivers. The method 
involves the use of a network of reference stations with high-
gain antennas to provide raw signal samples of P(Y) signals. 
The GPS receiver also provides raw signal samples to an 
authentication server, that once corrected for Doppler, are 
correlated with the signal samples obtained from the reference 
stations. The known phase relationship of the P(Y) to the C/A 
is fundamental in the authentication scheme, allowing Doppler 
and the start of a given set of samples to be identified. The 
high-gain antennas are necessary to increase the signal to 
noise ratio, as the P(Y) is immersed in thermal noise, and 
multiplying the two sets of signal samples also multiplies the 
noise. In order to improve the performance of the method 
proposed by [6], additional processing gain could be obtained 
by multiplying the signal by the known P-code in order to 
recover the W-code. As the P(Y)-code is a modulo-2 sum of 
the P-code and W-code at a rate of 511.5 kHz, the P-code can 
be removed using a locally generated replica. If successfully 
removed, only the W-code modulation should remain. This 
should effectively reduce the bandwidth from about 20 MHz 
to about 1 MHz, providing significant processing gain. 
Although the above method would be very effective in 
authenticating GPS signals, this is definitely not a mass-
market approach. Not only is there significant cost for 
receivers in terms of front-ends able to down-convert and 
sample signals of a bandwidth 10 times that of the C/A, the 
infrastructure required to facilitate the authentication (the 
network of ground stations) also represents a significant cost. 
This paper focuses on low-cost anti-spoofing methods suitable 
for mass-market receivers.  
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Warner et. al. in [7] presents a number of low-cost GPS 
spoofing countermeasures, some of which can be applied as a 
software upgrade and others that involve retrofitting the GPS 
receiver. The first three methods described by the authors are 
based on monitoring the absolute GPS signal strength, changes 
in the signal strength over time and the variance of signal 
strengths for each satellite signal for unrealistic values from an 
unsophisticated spoofer. Such methods assume the naive use 
of a GPS constellation simulator for spoofing.  
Other countermeasures proposed by Warner et. al. in [7] are 
based on recognizing characteristics of the simulator, such as 
monitoring the PRNs and satellite geometry in the case a 
spoofer is not attempting to mimic the true satellite 
constellation, monitoring the times at which various satellites 
appear based on the assumption that all satellites will be 
immediately visible in a non-sophisticated spoofing attack; 
and monitoring the GPS time with respect to a local clock. 
Most of these countermeasures can be easily defeated by 
loosely synchronizing the simulation.  
Wen et. al in [8] proposes a number of similar 
countermeasures for single frequency GPS receivers 
including: monitoring of signal power (absolute, rate of 
change and relative signal strength between carriers); 
validation of Doppler shift; validation of satellite positions and 
ephemeris; and jump detection. They additionally propose 
methods for dual frequency receivers including cross-
correlation of P(Y) on L1 and L2 and monitoring of range 
differences between L1 and L2 for differences caused by delay 
in the ionosphere. The dual frequency methods are not suitable 
for a mass-market receivers for the reasons articulated above. 
One of the low-cost anti-spoofing defenses proposed by 
Humphreys et. al. in [9] involves monitoring consecutive 
accumulations at the C/A code-length interval for unexpected 
sign changes. As the mechanisms they propose are 
autonomous (i.e. they do not connect to an external observer 
to authenticate the data), for spoofing to be detected, the 
receiver must have been tracking legitimate GNSS signals 
prior to spoofing, or there must be the presence of at least one 
legitimate PRN in order for the difference in accumulated C/A 
code phases to be observed. Figure 3 illustrates this concept 
with the GPS L1 C/A bit train. 
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Figure 3. Expected and observed code phase accumulations for GPS C/A 
NAV under spoofing conditions 
 
A limitation of this method is that low signal power or 
unintentional interference could cause unexpected sign 
changes thereby raising false spoofing alarms. This method 
would not detect spoofing scenarios in which the receiver is 
powered on in the presence of spoofing, such that the spoofer 
is connected directly to the receiver via an RF cable and 
legitimate GNSS signals are not visible to the receiver. In this 
case, differences would not be observed in code phase 
accumulations. The following sections describe loosely and 
tightly synchronized spoofing scenarios. 
B. Loosely synchronized spoofing scenario 
In this scenario, a loosely synchronized spoofing attack would 
involve the synchronization of an off-the-shelf simulator with 
a GNSS receiver, using a PC for the generation of predicted 
navigation data and for the remote control of the simulator 
(Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Loosely synchronized spoofing scenario 
 
This type of spoofing presents a potentially serious risk to 
GNSS applications deployed in safety and financially critical 
applications. Although 12-channel constellation simulators are 
still very expensive to acquire, they can be rented cheaply and 
the technical / engineering expertise required to perform a 
loosely synchronized spoofing attack is negligible.  
A number of mass-market receivers support binary protocols 
that provide access to raw measurements including the 
following: 
• Raw GPS subframes or Galileo words transmitted 
asynchronously within milliseconds of the parity 
verification; 
• Raw pseudoranges;  
• Accumulated carrier cycles for each channel; 
• Doppler frequency for each channel; and 
• C/N0 in dBHz for each channel 
 
Such raw measurements can be used to remotely control the 
simulation, such that the channel Doppler frequency, 
pseudoranges and signal power for each channel are consistent 
with those observed by the receiver. The desired position can 
then be obtained by ramping up or down the pseudoranges via 
the simulator’s remote command interface.  
The raw GPS subframes / Galileo words  provide the data bits 
required to replicate the navigation message, such that once 
sufficient bits of the new data set are collected, the navigation 
message can be predicted (i.e. TOW, parity, etc. updated). 
In order to synchronize the time of the simulation, the 1PPS 
output of the GNSS receiver can be used. If the absolute signal 
strength is an issue, a hardware attenuator can be used to limit 
the signal power from the simulator, such that it is within the 
expected GPS signal power threshold (about -160 dBW [10]).  
The following subsections discuss various methods of 
replicating navigation data, such that the navigation data 
modulated on the simulated signal is consistent with the 
navigation data observed from the actual GNSS. 
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1) Navigation message prediction 
Humpheries et. al. [9] discusses the design of a GPS receiver / 
spoofer in which the delay incurred by relaying the data bits 
from the GPS receiver is removed by predicting data bits 
given knowledge of the structure and recent bit observations. 
As the authors note, there are issues with this method near the 
two-hour ephemeris update boundaries, where it would not be 
possible to accurately predict the data.  
For the GPS L1 navigation message, new datasets containing 
ephemeris and clock parameters are transmitted every two 
hours during normal operation, with a corresponding curve-fit 
interval of four hours [10]. The minimum amount of time 
required to obtain the entire navigation data set (all pages of 
subframes 4 and 5) is 12.5 minutes, assuming there are no 
issues demodulating the navigation data. After a data cut-over 
boundary, a spoofer would have to wait for at least 18 seconds 
for the first three subframes containing clock parameters and 
ephemerides before being able to predict navigation message, 
assuming the spoofer was able to obtain the other data sets that 
are updated less frequently beforehand.  
A page within the navigation message of particular interest is 
the Navigation Message Correction Table (NMCT), 
transmitted in subframe 4. This page contains non-predictable 
data bits which would require the spoofer to wait a further 6.5 
minutes if the spoofer does not want to introduce a delay in 
the simulated data stream (assuming subframe 4 transmission 
starts from page 1 for a new data set).  The NMCT page is 
typically updated in intervals consistent with ephemeris 
updates. Navigation data prediction should be able to defeat 
GNSS spoofing detection mechanisms based on the 
authentication of ephemeris data, authentication of raw 
subframes or verification of data consistency with respect to 
almanac values. 
The Galileo I/NAV message stream contains words with non-
predictable bits that are utilized for the method proposed in 
this paper (refer to Section IV for details). The words 
containing non-predictable bits are present in the data stream 
every 30 seconds, therefore navigation data prediction cannot 
be used. In this case, a navigation data relaying strategy for 
spoofing the I/NAV message stream has to be taken. 
2) Navigation data relaying 
Navigation data relaying requires the spoofer to relay 
navigation data bits received by a GNSS receiver to the 
simulator. In the loosely synchronized spoofing scenario, the 
spoofer only has access to the binary protocol and raw 
subframes after they have been received and parity has been 
verified. Given that it takes 6 seconds to receive a subframe 
from GPS L1 C/A and that the binary protocol outputs the 
subframes asynchronously, the expected delay between the 
actual GPS navigation stream and the simulated stream is 6 
seconds + delays due to binary communication protocol + 
simulator buffering (common simulators require remote 
modification commands to be executed at least 400ms before 
the command’s reference time). For Galileo E1-B, the 
expected delay would be approximately 1 second to obtain a 
page part + communication and buffering delays + 1 second to 
regenerate the page part. 
Galileo pages are protected with three levels of error coding. 
Each page contains a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for error 
detection; a half rate Viterbi forward error correction (FEC) is 
applied to the message; and finally the resulting frame is 
block-interleaved with n columns (where data is written) and k 
rows (where data is read) in order to provide robustness to the 
FEC decoding algorithm by avoiding packets of errors. 
For I/NAV pages, the block interleaver size is 240 symbols 
with dimensions of n=30; k=8 [11]. Page error coding 
therefore imposes a delay of 1 second on the spoofer before it 
is able to access the data bits of the page, given a symbol rate 
of 250 symbols / second for the E1-B.  
As long as the target receiver only tracks spoofed satellites 
and does not verify the GNSS time with  an independent 
clock, the spoofing attack would most likely be successful. 
If the targeted GNSS receiver is able to acquire satellites from 
the actual constellation as well as the simulation, a number of 
consistency issues will arise. In order to avoid large errors in 
the navigation solution, the spoofer would have to assure that 
a beginning of subframe for each spoofed satellite is within 
approximately 20ms of those received from actual GNSS 
satellites. This is because time delays from the satellites are in 
the range of 67ms (20192 km/c) to 86ms (25785 km/c), where 
c is the speed of light. If the user is on the surface of the earth, 
the maximum differential delay time from two different 
satellites should be within 19 (86–67) ms. Therefore, if there 
is a differential delay greater than 19 ms, is likely that the 
receiver is tracking both legitimate and spoofed GNSS signals. 
The spoofer could delay the navigation bit stream by a 
subframe in order to remove the excessive delay observed 
from the frame synchronization function of the receiver. As 
the time of week (TOW) of a given subframe increments 
every 6 seconds, it is assumed that all subframes will be 
received within the epoch of a given TOW. Most receivers 
therefore do not check the consistency of the TOW across 
subframes received on each channel. In order to detect late 
subframes, the GNSS receiver can simply check that the time 
of week (TOW) of the subframe received on each channel is 
equal.  
C. Tightly synchronized navigation data relay scenario 
Figure 5 illustrates the configuration of a receiver-spoofer and 
a spoofing scenario for a single channel, where the spoofer 
attempts to synchronize the simulated signal with that of the 
real GNSS.  
 
Figure 5. Tightly synchronized spoofing scenario 
 
This type of spoofing attack requires purpose built hardware 
as well as significant technical / engineering expertise. The 
cost of such equipment however, has been significantly 
reduced in the past few years due to the availability of open-
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source Software Defined Radio (SDR) software such as GNU 
radio1 and low-cost hardware such as the Universal Software 
Radio Peripheral (USRP) from Ettus Research2.  This 
subsection discusses the characteristics of a tightly 
synchronized navigation data relay attack. 
Let si denote the spoofer’s receiver, sk  denote the spoofer’s 
satellite and ϕ  the processing delay (simulator buffering, etc.) 
of the spoofer. The receiver time for both non-spoofing ( )it  
and spoofing ˆ( )it  scenarios can be represented by Equations 
(1.2) and (1.3) respectively. 
 
k k
i it t τ= +  (1.2) 
ˆ s
s s s
kk k
i i i k it t τ ϕ ϕ τ= + + + +  (1.3) 
 
The delay due to spoofing is illustrated in Figure 6, where a 
delay of at least one code period + processing delay and 
buffering  is observed (Galileo E1-B has a code period of 4ms 
and GPS C/A has a code period of 1ms). The reason for this 
delay is explained below in terms of the GPS L1 C/A signal. 
 
Epoch i Epoch i+1 Epoch i+2 Epoch i+3
Epoch i Epoch i+1 Epoch i+2 Epoch i+3Spoofing delay
 
Figure 6. Delay due to spoofing for GPS (1ms) and Galileo E1-B (4ms) 
 
As the authentic signal arrives with a signal power below 
thermal noise, the individual BPSK modulated chips of the 
spreading code cannot be easily observed and must therefore 
be correlated with a locally generated replica code in order to 
de-spread the signal. This delay ( )
si
ϕ  typically accounts for at 
least 1ms (the period of the GPS C/A code). In a single 1ms 
frame, correlation with the correct PRN will result in a 
correlation peak. If the C/N0 is low, the correlation peak may 
be obscured by noise. GPS receivers can correlate the signal 
over several frames (1ms code periods) in order to increase 
sensitivity. Tracking sensitivity can be further increased by the 
incoherent sum of frames accumulated by a coherent 
integrator. For the purposes of spoofing, however, it is 
important to obtain the code phase in the minimum time 
possible (i.e. 1 frame).  
For GPS, access to real-time code phase information can be 
easily obtained through software in the baseband processor by 
accessing the in-phase correlator registers that provide the 
code phase for each channel. Many GPS baseband processors 
generate an interrupt synchronized to the channel code 
generation epoch timing. 
While Galileo E1-B has a primary code period of 4ms [11], 
1ms frames can be correlated with partial segments of the 
primary code. For the purposes of determining the code phase 
for spoofing, the code phase could be obtained from the partial 
correlations. The correlation peak of such partial correlations 
may be obscured by noise in low C/N0 situations.  
For both GPS C/A and Galileo E1-B, a spoofing threshold of 
1ms is defined. This threshold is used as a higher bound for 
the spoofing detection scheme, where it is assumed that 
 
1 http://gnuradio.org/ 
2 http://www.ettus.com/ 
achieving synchronization with authentic GNSS signals below 
these thresholds would require a significantly increased 
engineering effort and cost.  
Processing delay and buffering of the simulation accounts for 
the remaining component of the spoofing delay ( )
sk
ϕ . If the 
spoofer is attempting to synchronize the simulation of GNSS 
signals such that they are within ½ a chip of the authentic 
signal (in order to prevent the loss of code lock), an additional 
code period would be required (i.e. 1ms for GPS C/A and 4ms 
for Galileo E1-B). Assuming that the spoofer is not concerned 
with synchronizing the simulation to within ½ a chip of the 
actual signal, buffering of the simulation could account for as 
little as a few microseconds (a few code chips). 
Similarly to the loosely synchronized navigation data relay 
scenario, if the target receiver only tracks spoofed satellites, 
the spoofing attack would most likely be successful. As the 
time delay of the spoofed signal is negligible (milliseconds) in 
the tightly synchronized scenario, precise measurement of the 
time drift would be required. 
If the targeted GNSS receiver is able to acquire satellites from 
the actual constellation as well as the simulation, consistency 
issues in the navigation solution will arise. Matlab was used to 
simulate the impact of delays in various channels on the 
resulting navigation solution. The first subframe index 
(milliseconds from start of tracking) for each channel in the 
digitized signal was delayed by up to 10 milliseconds. Table 1 
illustrates the results of a series of navigation solutions 
computed using the least-squares method, where spoofing was 
simulated with a delay of 1 millisecond (1 GPS C/A code 
epoch) for all channels and various mixed cases. The results 
indicate that unless all channels are delayed, significant 
changes in the clock bias and in particular, the height of the 
navigation solution can occur when some (not all) of the 
channels have been delayed.  
 
Navigation 
Solution 
Nominal  
(6 channels) 
Delay of 1 
code epoch 
for all 
channels 
Delay of 1 
code epoch 
for first 3 
channels 
Delay of 1 
code epoch 
for only 1 
channel 
Delay of 1 
code epoch 
for all but 1 
channel 
X 4.4723e6 4.4723e6 4.0163e6 4.1967e6 4.4100e6 
Y 6.0141e5 6.0141e5 6.3828e5 4.2402e5 5.4894e5 
Z 4.4926e6 4.4926e6 5.0529e6 4.3274e6 4.1851e6 
dti 5.7039e5 5.7038e5 4.4580e3 3.6496e5 3.1813e5 
Latitude 45.0652 45.0653 45.1160 45.9356 43.4819 
Longitude 7.6588 7.6589 9.0300 5.7695 7.0955 
Height (m) 182.9706 175.1129 -6.2601e5 -3.2409e5 -2.6356e5 
Table 1. Simulated spoofing and resulting navigation solutions using least-
squares method 
 
In the following section, we propose a method for the 
detection of both the loosely and tightly synchronized 
spoofing scenarios described. 
IV. PROPOSED SPOOFING DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
This section discusses the proposed spoofing detection method 
consisting of a combination of techniques that can provide 
effective detection of the spoofing scenarios described in 
Section III, whilst being suitable for implementation in mass-
market receivers. Individual techniques such as navigation 
message authentication and monitoring of the time drift cannot 
provide protection against the spoofing scenarios described in 
Section III. However, these methods, combined with the 
requirement for timing of non-predictable data bits, can 
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provide a robust spoofing detection solution. As parts of the 
navigation message are non-predictable, a spoofer is 
constrained to relay navigation data bits in real time. 
Navigation message authentication, by means of observations 
by a trusted observer, provides the receiver with a guarantee 
that the navigation messages have not been tampered with in 
order to facilitate spoofing. This allows the receiver to trust 
the ephemerides and clock correction terms contained within 
the navigation message.  
By timing the reception of a subframe containing non-
predictable bits, it is possible to determine if the GNSS time 
has drifted beyond the threshold for spoofing (nominally 1ms), 
with respect to an independent undisciplined clock. This 
assumes that the undisciplined clock has been synchronized to 
GNSS time in a secure way and that the oscillator is 
sufficiently stable to maintain accuracy between subsequent 
receptions of subframes containing non-predictable data bits. 
In order for a given channel to be validated, the non-
predicable data bits must be verified by means of navigation 
message authentication. Figure 7 illustrates the logical 
processing blocks and data flow of a trusted GNSS receiver 
implementing the proposed techniques. 
 
Satellite 
Positions 
Calculation
Navigation Data 
Authentication /  
Non-predictable 
Data Ident.
Correlator 
Channel
Code phase
Code cycle count
Code data sample
Navigation Data 
Extraction
bit and frame 
synchronization
Pseudorange 
calculation
User Position 
Calculation
Timer / Counter
GNSS Clock Ref
Undisciplined Clock Ref
Time Drift 
Detection and 
Synchronization
Ctl
GNSS Sanity 
Checks
User Position 
Security State
Figure 7. Baseband processing of trusted GNSS receiver 
 
In terms of hardware requirements, the technique requires an 
additional, undisciplined clock and a baseband processor with 
at least two timer channels. Three additional functions need to 
be implemented in the firmware of the baseband processor: 
A) navigation data authentication and identification of non-
predictable bits; B) GNSS sanity checks; and C) time drift 
detection and synchronization. These functions are described 
in the following subsections. 
A. Authentication of Navigation Data and Non-predictable 
Bits 
This section discusses navigation message authentication of 
GPS subframes or Galileo words containing non-predictable 
bits. It is assumed that a spoofer will not be able to simulate in 
real-time subframes containing non-predictable bits without a 
significant time delay (order of milliseconds). In order to find 
subframes in GPS containing non-predictable bits, an external 
GPS antenna was installed on the roof of the building housing 
the Qascom office, allowing raw subframes to be captured for 
a number of weeks. A GPS receiver with raw measurement 
capability was used to capture the raw subframes, including 
those not used by civilian GPS receivers. The following 
subsections discuss subframes containing non-predictable bits 
that were found in the GPS naviation message, and Galileo 
words with non-predictable bits based on currently available 
documentation. 
1) GPS L1 Navigation Data Validation 
GPS navigation subframes were analyzed for the presence of 
non-predictable data bits that could be used to authenticate 
GPS satellites from simulated ones. Two types of non-
predictable subframes were identified: subframes containing 
the Navigation Message Correction Table (NMCT) and 
specific “Reserved for System Use” data. The following 
subsections discuss in more detail the characteristics of the 
non-predictable data observed in GPS navigation data 
subframes. 
a) Encrypted NMCT data for WAGE 
Wide Area GPS Enhancement (WAGE) is a method to 
increase the horizontal accuracy of the GPS encrypted P(Y) 
code by adding additional pseudorange correction data to the 
satellite broadcast navigation message. WAGE data is 
encrypted, making it available only to the Precise Positioning 
Service (PPS) or P(Y) code receivers. WAGE data are 
transmitted in page 13 of subframe 4 of the GPS navigation 
data (NAV), referred to as the Navigation Message Correction 
Table (NMCT) [12]. Each NMCT contains an availability 
indicator (AI) that indicates one of the following availability 
options: 
1. The correction table is unencrypted and is available 
to both authorized and unauthorized users; 
2. The correction table is encrypted and is available 
only to authorized users (normal mode); 
3. No correction table available for either authorized or 
unauthorized users; or 
4. Reserved. 
 
The NMCT contains pseudorange error estimations for 30 
slots that correspond to the 30 satellites in ascending order 
excluding the transmitting satellite (Table 2). The estimated 
range deviation (ERD) fields are encrypted.   
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Table 2. GPS NAV Subframe 4 (Page No. 13 NMCT) 
 
During normal operations, the clock and ephemeris data sets 
(subframes 1, 2 and 3) are transmitted by a satellite for a 
period of 2 hours with a corresponding curve fit interval of 4 
hours. In order to utilize this information for the purpose of 
validating the authenticity of navigation data, it is imperative 
that the AI bits indicate the correction table is encrypted and 
that the NMCT is valid. Only one satellite that did not transmit 
encrypted NMCT was observed (PRN 32). This satellite’s AI 
field indicated that the NMCT was not available. The contents 
of the NMCT in this case were predictable and should 
therefore not be considered for validating the authenticity of 
navigation data. 
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The NMCT from a 12-channel GPS constellation simulator 
was also analyzed. By default the NMCT was disabled on all 
PRNs. Once enabled, the NMCT was simulated with 
unencrypted data. In order to ensure that plausible data 
generated by a spoofer can be detected, valid NMCT data 
must be authenticated by means of a trusted observer (i.e. 
navigation message authentication). The validity of the NMCT 
data can be calculated by performing the following 
calculations [12]. The age of data offset (AODO) term, which 
is transmitted in subframe 2, must be less than 27900 seconds 
in order for the NMCT from the transmitting satellite to be 
valid. If the term is equal to 27900 seconds, the NMCT is 
invalid and shall not be used. If the NMCT is valid, the 
validity time nmctt  can be computed as illustrated in Equation 
(1.4). 
 
mod7200
if 0,  
if 0,  7200
oe
nmct oe
nmct oe
offset t
offset t t AODO
offset t t offset AODO
=
= = −
> = − + −
 (1.4) 
 
where oet  is the ephemeris epoch time reference. 
The value must then be corrected for beginning and end of 
week crossovers as illustrated in Equation (1.5). 
 
if 302400,  604800
if 302400,  604800
k
nmct nmct nmct
k
nmct nmct nmct
t t t t
t t t t
− > = +
− < − = −
 (1.5) 
 
where kt  is the time of transmission in GPS time. 
The NMCT validity time must be verified with respect to the 
current ephemeris epoch reference in order to insure that the 
NMCT data is non-predictable for the current ephemeris 
epoch. It is possible that nmctt  of the current NMCT is older 
than an ephemeris epoch (nominally 7200 seconds), and 
therefore is predictable on an ephemeris data crossover (i.e. 
when Issue of Data Clock (IODC) / Issue of Data Ephemeris 
(IODE) values change). The trusted observer used for 
navigation message authentication should provide the time the 
current NMCT was first observed in addition to providing 
authentication of the subframes containing the NMCT terms. 
It is noted in [12] that NMCT information is supported by the 
block IIR GPS satellites only when operating in the IIA mode 
of operation. 
b) Reserved for system use messages 
During the observation of navigation messages for non-
predictable data, a number of undocumented messages were 
observed. In particular, a number of pages from subframe 4 
did not appear to be deterministic. According to the Interface 
Control Document (ICD) [12], subframe 4 is subcommutated 
25 times; the 25 versions of these subframes are referred to as 
pages 1 through 25 of each subframe. With the possible 
exception of "reserved for system use" pages and explicit 
repeats, each page contains different specific data in words 3 
through 10. (Refer to Table 20-V of the GPS ICD [12]) 
The undocumented pages 1, 6, 11, 16 and 21 (each with SV 
page ID 57), identified as “reserved” in the ICD, were 
monitored for a number of weeks to determine the repetition 
rate and predictability of data transmitted over this period.  
Table 3 illustrates the results of one week of analysis of the 
“reserved for system use” messages. The data found in these 
messages was identical for pages 1, 6, 11, 16 and 21. 
 
Day 
of 
Week 
Week 
N° 
Reserved Field 1 
(128-bits) 
Reserved 
Field 2 
(16-bits) 
Mon n 7E9CF7839C08F1E4EB5F06850FE6E94A 0103 
Tue n F913438213CAFD84A3A15F3A653BBE62 0203 
Wed n 343DC30C3DCB4E70326A57C8DAEAF09A 0303 
Thur n 80C16989C175F6023321DF32606C7DC6 0403 
Fri n FF9EDB629E8590F577808AFDC517BF33 0503 
… … … … 
Mon n + 1 A8F59BA2F56EE5B6D055B44F3745F693 0104 
Tue n + 1 318E83FC8E3B1E778D8D37671FDEF564 0204 
Table 3. Data monitored in pages 1, 6, 11, 16 & 21 of subframe 4 
 
Two distinct fields were observed in the 144 bits of reserved 
data. Field 1 changes daily and does not appear to have any 
predictable pattern in the samples collected over a week. Field 
2 appears to be a counter that increments every time field 1 
changes. The 8 MSBs increment daily, 8 LSBs increment 
weekly.  
Due to the lack of information, further attempts were made to 
analyze the value using a 12-channel GNSS constellation 
simulator running in “turbo-mode”. The values observed in the 
navigation message were “AAAAAAAAAAAA…” for field 1 and 
“AAAA” for field 2 for any TOW and WN. It appears as though 
these fields are related to restricted or classified functionality, 
possibly over-the-air keying with a crypto-period of 24 hours, 
as such data fields are not simulated on GPS simulators for 
civilian use. We therefore assume that the data in this message 
cannot be easily predicted and simulated before it is 
transmitted by genuine GPS satellites. 
2) Galileo Safety of Life Service Data Validation 
A number of words in the I/NAV message structure contain 
non-predictable bits that can be used to differentiate authentic 
Galileo navigation messages from simulated ones. The I/NAV 
message structure is transmitted on both E5b-I and E1-B 
signals in order to support a dual frequency service [11], 
implicitly providing support for the proposed spoofing 
detection method on both frequencies. 
A subframe on the E1-B signal has a duration of 30 seconds, 
where the chipping rate of the signal is 250 symbols / second. 
The following subsection details the words in the identified 
I/NAV pages that are suitable for verification of navigation 
message authenticity. 
a) SoL Integrity Table  
In order to support the Galileo Safety of Life (SoL) service on 
the E1-B signal, integrity tables are broadcast in nominal 
I/NAV pages every 30 seconds. These tables consist of flags 
that indicate the integrity status of the signal broadcast by each 
satellite for a given integrity satellite navigation frame. The 
flags indicate either: SV (satellite vehicle) not OK for use or 
SV OK with a given value of SISMA (signal in space 
monitored accuracy) [13]. A mechanism is additionally 
provided to support the authentication of the integrity tables. 
Preliminary information of SoL service indicates that 
authentication data changes each integrity satellite navigation 
frame (30 second epoch) and is non-predictable. 
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B. GNSS Sanity Checks 
Before the time delay verification can be performed, the 
following sanity checks need to be executed to ensure the 
integrity of the time delay calculations.   
• Verification that TOW of subframes across all channels 
are equal; 
• Verification that the maximum differential delay time 
between pairs of satellites is less than or equal to 19ms 
(refer to  III.B.2); and 
• Verification that the height from the navigation 
solution is within defined thresholds (e.g. 0-4000m, 
threshold is adjusted with respect to application 
requirements). A digital barometric altimeter could be 
used by the receiver to validate the height with respect 
to a defined threshold, although this would not be 
useful for self-spoofing, as such devices can easily be 
tampered with. As described in III.C, delays of at least 
1ms observed on some (not all) channels tend to result 
in significant errors in the clock bias, and in particular 
the height of the navigation solution. This effect is 
negligible if all channels are delayed.  
 
The above sanity checks serve to identify if there are both 
simulated and genuine GNSS satellites present in the 
navigation solution. If these sanity checks pass, it is likely that 
either all satellites are spoofed, or all satellites are genuine. 
Therefore, the receiver can proceed with time delay 
verification based on the assumption that the clock bias 
calculation will be reliable. If the checks fail, the presence of 
spoofing is flagged. 
C. Time Drift Detection and Synchronization 
As discussed in Section III, spoofing by relaying navigation 
message bits, it is likely that a delay of at least 1ms will be 
introduced into the navigation message stream of the spoofed 
signal. While navigation bits can be predicted, it is assumed 
for this method that certain GPS subframes / Galileo words 
cannot be predicted, and therefore must be relayed. Refer to 
Section IV.A for details of which bits of GPS NAV and 
Galileo I/NAV cannot be predicted.  
Equation (1.6) illustrates how the time delay incurred due to 
spoofing can be observed using an independent clock, not 
disciplined by GNSS. 
 
s s s
k
uc i i i k uct t τ ϕ ϕ ε− = + + +  (1.6) 
 
where, uct is the GNSS time obtained from an undisciplined 
clock; it is the receiver GNSS time; s
k
iτ is the travel time 
between the spoofer and the targeted receiver (i.e. if the 
distance is 1 meter, the travel time will be approximately 
3.3356×10-6ms); 
si
ϕ is the delay incurred by receiving the data 
bit (i.e. de-spreading of signal); 
sk
ϕ  the delay incurred due to 
processing and buffering for retransmission by the simulator; 
and
 uc
ε is the local undisciplined clock error, which needs to 
be less than 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+
 
if the signal is to be authenticated. The 
relationship between the GNSS time of transmission and the 
GNSS time at the receiver is illustrated in Equation (1.7). 
 
( )skki it t P c= +  (1.7) 
 
where it  is the receiver’s GNSS time and 
k
iP  is the 
psuedorange observation whose relationship between the 
geometric range kiρ , receiver clock bias idt , satellite clock 
offset (code phase and equipment delay terms) kdt , 
tropospheric delay kiT , ionospheric delay 
k
iI  and pseudorange 
observation error kie  is illustrated in Equation (1.8). 
 
( )k k k k k ki i i i i iP c dt dt T I eρ= + − + + +  (1.8) 
 
The time drift between the local undisciplined clock and the 
GNSS time for the purpose of authentication can be obtained 
from the absolute GNSS sample clock cycle count (start of 
code index) corresponding to the beginning of an 
authenticated subframe (or Galileo word) containing non-
predictable data bits.  
The receiver clock bias, idt , and position are determined 
through the linearization of a nonlinear equation solving four 
unknowns (the receiver ECEF position , ,i i iX Y Z  and idt )  for 
a set of at least four pseudoranges using a method such as the 
least-squares method (refer to Section II). It is imperative that 
the equation is solved using authenticated TOW (Time of 
Week) (for satellite positions which require time of 
transmission corrected by travel time), satellite clock offset 
values, ephemerides, tropospheric and ionospheric delay 
correction terms.  
Once idt  is known, the time offset between the GNSS time at 
which the beginning of a subframe containing non-predictable 
data bits is received and the GNSS time derived from the local 
undisciplined clock can be calculated. The GNSS time at the 
beginning of subframe refers to the time at which the rising-
edge of the first chip of the first code of the first data bit of the 
subframe is received. 
Figure 8 illustrates the logical blocks of two general purpose 
timer channels used to calculate the time offset between the 
GNSS receiver’s reference clock  (clock used to sample GNSS 
signal) and the local undisciplined clock. Both timers are 
configured with a comparator that resets its corresponding 
counter once the frame epoch has been reached. The epoch 
interrupt of the GNSS reference clock counter is used by the 
acquisition engine, correlators and the 1PPS (1 pulse per 
second) generator. In order to keep track of the current epoch, 
an epoch count register is incremented when an interrupt is 
raised by the comparator. Multi-channel timers are commonly 
found in microcontrollers and a number of GNSS baseband 
processors. 
The time offset between the GNSS reference clock rclk  and 
the undisciplined clock uclk  in clock cycles can be calculated 
for a given time t using Equation (1.9). 
 
( )( , ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ) ( )
rclk rclk
uclk uclk
t rclk uclk EpochCount t n CycleCount t
EpochCount t n CycleCount t
Δ = ⋅ + −
⋅ +
(1.9) 
 
where ( )rclkEpochCount t is the epoch count of the GNSS 
reference clock at time t; ( )rclkCycleCount t  is the cycle count 
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of the GNSS reference clock at time t; ( )uclkEpochCount t  is 
the epoch count of the undisciplined clock at time t; 
( )uclkCycleCount t  is the cycle count of the undisciplined clock 
at time t; and n is the number of clock cycles per epoch (frame 
epoch is typically a multiple of 1023 for GPS L1 C/A or 4096 
for Galileo E1-B). 
Prescaler 16-bit Counter
(clock cycle count)
16-bit Comparator 
(frame epoch)
16-bit Comparator 
(frame epoch)
Peripheral Bus
Reset
ResetGNSS sample 
clock ref
Undisciplined 
clock ref
(Local 
oscillator)
12-channel 
Correlator
Additional Timing 
Components for Time 
Drift Detection
Acquisition EnginePrescaler
Cycle Count 
Capture Register
SW Trigger
16-bit Counter
(clock cycle count)
16-bit Counter
(epoch count)
16-bit Counter
(epoch count)
 
Figure 8. Time drift detection timer configuration 
 
In order to achieve a constant time t across timer channels, a 
cycle count capture register for the undisciplined clock 
counter is configured to latch when the software trigger has 
been activated and the GNSS reference clock counter reaches 
frame epoch.  
Once the offset between the two clocks is known, the absolute 
cycle count of the undisciplined clock for the beginning of 
subframe ( ( ))uclkAbsCycleCount bsf can be calculated using 
Equation (1.10).  
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( , )
uclk rclk
rclk
AbsCycleCount bsf EpochCount bsf n
CycleCount bsf t rclk uclk
= ⋅ +
+Δ
 (1.10) 
 
where ( )rclkEpochCount bsf  is the epoch count of the GNSS 
reference clock at the beginning of subframe (bsf ); 
( )rclkCycleCount bsf  is the cycle count of the GNSS sampling 
reference clock at the beginning of subframe; ( , )t rclk uclkΔ  is 
the offset between the two clocks; and n is the number of 
cycles per epoch. The beginning of subframe cycle and epoch 
count values are obtained from the bit and frame 
synchronization function, which in turn obtains these values 
from the prompt correlator. 
The GNSS time based on the undisciplined clock for the 
beginning of subframe, ( )uclkt bsf , is therefore calculated as 
follows:  
 
( ) ( )uclk uclk uclkt bsf AbsCycleCcount bsf GnssTimeOffset= + (1.11) 
 
where uclkGnssTimeOffset  is the GNSS system time offset 
from the local undisciplined clock in cycles, obtained during a 
secure time transfer or resynchronization process.  
The presence of spoofing due to the delay of the navigation 
message stream for a given satellite k can be determined using 
Equation (1.12). 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
s
s s
kk
rclk i
t uclk rclk i k
t bsf t bsf P c
SignalAuthentic k t t ϕ ϕ
= +
= − < +
  (1.12) 
 
Where ( )rclkt bsf  is the receiver time at the beginning of 
subframe, ( )kt bsf is the time of transmission from satellite k 
at the beginning of subframe obtained from the Time of Week 
(TOW) field of the subframe and the clock correction terms 
provided in the navigation message; and the threshold 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+ = 1ms for GPS C/A and Galileo E1-B (refer to 
Section III.C for discussion on data relay spoofing scenario). 
A channel is deemed authentic when ( )tSignalAuthentic k  is 
true for the reception of a subframe with non-predictable data 
bits that have been authenticated by a trusted observed. Once a 
channel transitions to the “authenticated” state, the channel 
state remains as “authenticated” until there is a loss of frame / 
bit synchronization or the local clock time drift exceeds the 
window of acceptance.  
On a successful authentication event, the clock offset 
uclkGnssTimeOffset can be updated using Equation (1.13). 
 
( )( ) ( )
uclk
rclk uclk
GnssTimeOffset
t bsf m AbsCycleCount bsf
=
⋅ −
 (1.13) 
 
where ( )rclkt bsf  is the receiver time at the beginning of 
subframe, m  is the milliseconds to clock cycles conversion 
factor and ( )uclkAbsCycleCount bsf  is the absolute cycle count 
of the undisciplined clock at the beginning of subframe. The 
navigation solution can be flagged as trusted when it is 
calculated from the observations of SVs (satellite vehicles) 
that have been verified for time drift. Both bit and frame 
synchronization for each channel must be monitored.  If  bit or 
frame synchronization is lost for a given channel with a 
previous state of “authenticated”, the channel security state 
must be reset to an “authenticity unknown” state.  
The degree to which detection of a spoofing delay is possible 
depends on the accuracy of the local clock. Table 4 illustrates 
the approximate times before different types of oscillators drift 
beyond 1ms. 
 
Crystal 
Oscillator  
Approx frequency deviation 
(PPM) 
Approx time till 
1ms drift 
Approx Cost 
XO 10 – 100 100 – 40 secs < $1 
TCXO 0.5 – 2 33.3 – 8.3 mins $1 - $50 
MCXO 0.01 – 0.1 27.7 – 2.7 hours < $1000 
OCXO 0.01 – 0.5 27.7 – 0.55 hours $200 - $2000 
Table 4. Comparison of crystal oscillators [14] (Note that costs have been 
updated) 
Table 5 compares the maximum frequency deviation of an 
oscillator in order to not drift by more than 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+  for series 
of time periods. The suitability of the various oscillators for 
time drift detection is detailed in Table 4 for each time period. 
GPS L1 subframes containing non-predictable data bits can be 
observed every 2 hours during normal operations (refer to the 
GPS ICD [12] for details of the other operational modes), 
 11 
whereas Galileo words containing non-predictable data bits 
can be observed every 30 seconds. 
  
Time period 
(*not suitable 
for GPS) 
Maximum frequency 
deviation in order to 
not drift by more than 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+ (1ms) 
Crystal Oscillator  
X
O
 
TC
X
O
 
M
C
X
O
 
O
C
X
O
 
1 minute* 16.6666 PPM Y Y Y Y 
30 minutes* 0.5556 PPM  Y Y Y 
2 hours 0.1388 PPM   Y Y 
4 hours 0.0694 PPM   Y Y 
1 day 0.0115 PPM   Y Y 
1 week 0.0016 PPM     
Table 5. Suitability of crystal oscillators for undisciplined clock for GPS L1 
and Galileo E1-B authentication 
 
The application of this method to GPS would be satisfactory 
for fixed (non-mobile) applications including secure time 
distribution (e.g. NTP servers), but not very practical for 
mobile applications, as failure to demodulate data bits for a 
sufficient number of channels in a data cross-over boundary 
would result in loss of time synchronization and therefore 
require secure time transfer before the position and time could 
be trusted. Secure time transfer involves setting the GNSS 
time offset value for the undisciplined clock ( )ucGTO  using 
secure methods that cannot be spoofed. Such methods include 
authenticated network time synchronization protocols that are 
able to synchronize the undisciplined clock to within 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+  
of GNSS time (1ms for GPS L1 and Galileo E1-B). Note that 
ucGTO  is in GNSS time and therefore is not corrected for 
UTC. 
Without an initial secure time transfer, the receiver will not be 
able to perform time drift verification and subsequently 
determine if the navigation solution can be trusted. Once a 
secure time transfer has occurred, the receiver is able to 
periodically synchronize the undisciplined clock when 
authenticated subframes with non-predictable data bits are 
acquired. Self-synchronization only works while the clock 
drift between the GNSS reference clock and the undisciplined 
clock is less than the spoofing delay 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+ . 
Self-synchronization involves the periodic synchronization of 
the undisciplined clock to the GNSS receiver clock when a 
GPS L1 subframe or Galileo E1-B I/NAV word with non-
predictable data bits is observed, and successfully 
authenticated. The synchronization can only take place if the 
drift between the GNSS reference clock and the undisciplined 
clock is less than the spoofing delay 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+ .  
In order to ensure that the undisciplined clock does not drift 
beyond the acceptance window (less than 
s si k
ϕ ϕ+ ), the 
receiver can periodically wake itself up via a timer at intervals 
when subframes with non-predictable data bits are expected in 
order to perform self-synchronization. These subframes must 
also be authenticated by a trusted observer. 
For example, for a Galileo OS receiver, the wakeup timer 
could be set for every 30 minutes if a TXCO (Temperature 
Compensated Crystal Oscillator) is used for the undisciplined 
clock, or even daily if a MCXO (Microprocessor Controlled 
Crystal Oscillator) or OCXO (Oven-Controlled Crystal 
Oscillator) is used. Self-synchronization is less effective for 
GPS, due to the long periods between the reception of 
subframes with non-predictable data bits. In the case of a GPS, 
the receiver should either wake up every 2 hours, or remain 
powered on. 
V. AUTHENTICATION SERVICES AND RECEIVER OPERATING 
STATES 
This section discusses the requirement for authentication 
services required to support the navigation data authentication 
function and operating states of a trusted GNSS receiver 
implementing the methods discussed in this paper.  
Figure 9 illustrates a GNSS broadcast authentication service 
comprised of one or more trusted observers, networks over 
which broadcast authentication messages are transmitted, and 
receivers that are able to receive the broadcast messages.  
The suitability of network technologies for the authentication 
of subframes / words depends on the characteristics of the 
GNSS application. For example, mobile applications could 
make use of network technologies such as GPRS (General 
Packet Radio Service of GSM) or DVB (Digital Video 
Broadcasting), whereas static applications could additionally 
make use of fixed network technologies such as DSL (Digital 
Subscriber Line). Existing networks used for the broadcast of 
GNSS augmentation data such as EDAS (EGNOS data access 
service) are potentially ideal candidates for the transmission of 
GNSS authentication data. Details of protocols to facilitate the 
exchange of authentication data between the GNSS receiver 
and the trusted observer, and key distribution and public key 
infrastructure issues are outside the scope of this paper. 
 
 
Figure 9. GNSS authentication broadcast service 
 
A GNSS receiver implementing the methods discussed in the 
preceding sections would be able to provide an alarm 
indicating the presence of spoofing and possibly a trusted 
navigation solution. The trusted GNSS receiver would start in 
an “unknown” state. In a cold start scenario, receiver’s 
undisciplined clock offset ( )ucGTO  has not been set and the 
receiver must therefore be synchronized with a trusted time 
source. In this case, the receiver transitions to the “time 
transfer required” state.  
Once secure time transfer has been performed, the receiver 
transitions to the "unknown” state until it is able to verify the 
authenticity of the GNSS signals or detect spoofing, resulting 
in transition to the “authenticated” or “spoofing detected” 
state. The presence of at least 4 authentication channels is 
sufficient to transition to the “authenticated” state. If bit 
synchronization is lost for a given channel, the security state 
for that channel is reset to “unknown”. 
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If the clock drift between the undisciplined clock and the 
GNSS clock exceeds the spoofing delay threshold, and the 
projected time drift is less than the threshold, spoofing is 
detected. In the case the projected time drift is equal to or 
greater than the threshold, indicating that self-synchronization 
was unsuccessful (e.g. due to low C/N0), the receiver 
transitions to the “time transfer required” state. The projected 
time drift is an estimation of the time drift based on the 
characteristics of the crystal oscillator, and is used to minimize 
false positives. The high-level states of receiver GNSS 
authenticity are illustrated in Figure 10. The receiver could 
operate in one of two modes, depending on the application: 
• an alarm-only mode: such that the navigation solution 
is assumed to be derived from authentic GNSS satellite 
signals until a spoofing alarm is raised;  
• a secure navigation mode: such that a navigation 
solution is only provided when sufficient channels have 
been authenticated, and the navigation solution 
comprising of the 4 authentication channels is within a 
threshold the mixed solution (the threshold being 
compatible with application performance 
requirements). 
Authenticated
Time Transfer Required
Spoofing Detected
Unknown
Projected time drift of 
   undisciplined clock 
       exceeds spoofing 
           delay
                       ≥ 4 channels    
           authenticated by 
   spoofing detection 
               method
              < 4 authenticated
          channels (e.g. bit 
     synch lost for some 
channels)
Reset event
Secure time transfer 
performed
Spoofing 
detection method 
detects spoofing
         Spoofing 
detection method   
      detects spoofing
Power on
receiver
≥ 4 channels authenticated by 
spoofing detection method
Projected time drift 
of undisciplined clock 
exceeds spoofing delay
Figure 10. Receiver GNSS authenticity state diagram 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper has discussed several spoofing 
scenarios and has presented a low-cost spoofing detection 
method suitable for numerous mass-market applications. The 
method exploits non-predictable characteristics of GPS L1 
C/A and the Galileo E1-B Safety of Life Service in 
combination with navigation message authentication and time 
delay verification to provide protection against the spoofing 
scenarios discussed. 
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